A small boat takes tourists to watch The Dubai Fountain show as Burj Khalifa, the world’s tallest building, is illuminated with the UAE national flag colors Dubai, United Arab Emirates, on May 6, 2026. [Altaf Qadri/AP]
The war in the Middle East will give birth to a new regional architecture. The first signs of this are already visible, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates being the main exponents of two different perceptions of the future of the region and the position of Iran and Israel in the emerging scenario. The confrontation between them is not new, but is relatively recent (it began in 2020), and was intensified by the war, as its side effects ranged from negative to painful, primarily for the Gulf states.
Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Iraq have so far paid the highest price, especially Qatar, which has the Strait of Hormuz as its only outlet for exports. The UAE has lost 44% of its oil production, having suffered over 2,000 attacks from Iran, although it is able to export a small part of its energy resources by bypassing Hormuz. The other monarchies are comparatively in a relatively better position, despite a reasonable slowdown in their economic growth, with Saudi Arabia taking advantage of high oil prices by redirecting part of its exports through a pipeline that ends in the Red Sea.
After the withdrawal of the UAE from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the OPEC+ alliance, which accounts for approximately 42% of global crude oil production, the renewed split of the Gulf alliance is a given. It follows the confrontation that erupted in 2018 between Qatar and its neighbors, only now the UAE is in its place, which, it should be noted, is moving particularly aggressively, with acquisitions and lobbying in the United States, having become, despite its significantly smaller size, the main competitor of Saudi Arabia.
The UAE projects the image of the “Switzerland of the Middle East,” attracting millions of tourists on an annual basis, offering high-quality health and education services, developing initiatives for religious pluralism, so as to constitute a model of a fairly modern country for the region, with tolerance and an emphasis on innovation. It also punished Pakistan by withdrawing almost $4 billion from the country’s central bank, because it demanded the marginalization of the Iranian regime and its collapse.
On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has had a very ambitious leader at its helm for years, who relatively painlessly overcame the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi and went from being a black sheep of Joe Biden’s administration, to one of Donald Trump’s favorite leaders. However, in order to fulfill the economic transformation and energy diversification program “Saudi Vision 2030” – with an emphasis on supply chains, technology, real estate and decoupling from oil – and various ambitious megaprojects, such as Neom, which would make Saudi Arabia a commercial and tourist hub, huge funds are required, which must be drawn from oil sales. Therefore, despite Trump’s constant urgings and the ad hoc search for a common denominator, Riyadh wants oil prices to remain high, against the wishes of the American president.
The most important difference, however, between Saudi Arabia and the UAE concerns their views on the future relations with Israel and Iran, which largely determines each side’s vision for the region. The Saudis are interested in the stability of the region and believe that only through a peace agreement with Iran, regardless of who leads it, is it possible to restore order. They also consider the Israeli agenda to be potentially destabilizing. Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey share the same view.
China, an important external player, seems to have a similar view, but with much less willingness and ability to intervene in regional events than the United States. The latter, along with Israel and the Emirates, believe that the current regime in Tehran will never be truly cooperative and will constitute a permanent source of instability in the Middle East, despite Trump’s attempt to disengage from the war, achieving at least a temporary agreement with the Iranians. India seems to be moving in the same direction, which, in addition to being an importer of energy from the countries of the region, is interested, like China, in developing plans to transport goods, hydrocarbons and data to Europe via the Middle East, with the UAE being the natural gateway to it.
Therefore, the ongoing realignment of regional alliances may well lead to the revision of plans that concern us. Greece is actively moving to develop footholds, while Europe as a whole must constitute an alternative to China and the United States and not remain an observer of developments.
Constantinos Filis is an associate professor at the American College of Greece and director of its Institute of Global Affairs.
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